Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
von MCMP Team
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Beschreibung
Mathematical Philosophy - the application of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy - is about to experience a tremendous boom in various areas of philosophy. At the new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is funded mostly by the German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, philosophical research will be carried out mathematically, that is, by means of methods that are very close to those used by the scientists. The purpose of doing philosophy in this way is not to reduce philosophy to mathematics or to natural science in any sense; rather mathematics is applied in order to derive philosophical conclusions from philosophical assumptions, just as in physics mathematical methods are used to derive physical predictions from physical laws. Nor is the idea of mathematical philosophy to dismiss any of the ancient questions of philosophy as irrelevant or senseless: although modern mathematical philosophy owes a lot to the heritage of the Vienna and Berlin Circles of Logical Empiricism, unlike the Logical Empiricists most mathematical philosophers today are driven by the same traditional questions about truth, knowledge, rationality, the nature of objects, morality, and the like, which were driving the classical philosophers, and no area of traditional philosophy is taken to be intrinsically misguided or confused anymore. It is just that some of the traditional questions of philosophy can be made much clearer and much more precise in logical-mathematical terms, for some of these questions answers can be given by means of mathematical proofs or models, and on this basis new and more concrete philosophical questions emerge. This may then lead to philosophical progress, and ultimately that is the goal of the Center.
| Name | Beschreibung | Erschienen | Preis | ||
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| 1 | VideoReference and Circularity in First-Order Arithmetical Systems | Lavinia Picollo (Buenos Aires) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (3 May, 2012) titled "Reference and Circularity in First-Order Arithmetical Systems". Abstract: | 4.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 2 | VideoThe Revision Theory of Truth (T#), FS and the Standard Model of PA | Eduardo Alejandro Barrio (Buenos Aires) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (2 May, 2012) titled "The Revision Theory of Truth (T#), FS and the Standard Model of PA". | 4.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 3 | VideoA Single-Type Semantics for Natural Language | Kristina Liefke (Tilburg) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (26 April, 2012) titled "A Single-Type Semantics for Natural Language". Abstract: Richard Montague's Intensional Logic [2] constitutes a milestone in the project of providing a formal semantics for natural language. Its use enables the systematic translation of natural into formal language expressions and allows a mathematically rigorous account of a wide range of semantic phenomena. Despite its success, Montague's logic has, in the last decade, been subject to significant criticism [1, 3]. The latter pertains to the descriptive inadequacy of its underlying system of semantic domains, especially of the distinction between the interpretive domains of noun phrases (i.e. individuals) and sentences (i.e. propositions). To remedy this inadequacy, I develop a semantics for natural language that replaces individuals and propositions by a single type of object (hence 'single-type semantics'). In particular, I compare different single-type alternatives, identify the most suitable candidate, and show that it models a standard fragment of English. | 4.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 4 | VideoLogic and reasoning | Jaroslav Peregrin (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (19 April, 2012) titled "Logic and reasoning". Abstract: Logic, it is often held, is primarily concerned with reasoning; and the conviction that logic and reasoning are two sides of the same coin nowadays usually equates with the conviction that logic spells out some directives for the "right" management of beliefs. In this talk I put forward an alternative view, based on seeing rules of logic rules as constitutive rules, not instructing us *how* to reason, but rather providing us with certain vehicles or *in terms of which* to reason. This also emphasizes the social nature of beliefs: they are entities forged in a social mold, formed by rules originating from social argumentative practices. Because of this fact, I suggest, trying to understand logic by means of studying (rules of) the kinematics of beliefs of a solitary individual is essentially misguided. | 1.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 5 | VideoAssertion, Denial and the Logic of Definedness | Greg Restall (Melbourne) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (18 April, 2012) titled "Assertion, Denial and the Logic of Definedness". | 1.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 6 | VideoSequent Systems and Defining Rules | Greg Restall (Melbourne) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (12 Apr, 2012) titled "Sequent Systems and Defining Rules". Abstract: In this talk I will explain how it can be that inference rules can be used to define a class of concepts, and why there are at least three grades of logical complexity (propositional connectives, quantifiers, and modals), depending on the kinds of discourse features exploited in those rules. I'll then explain how concepts characterised by "defining rules" (which I’ll precisely characterise) have a number of important features, such as admitting a uniform cut elimination argument. | 1.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 7 | VideoWhat would count as Ibn Sina (11th c. Persia) having first order logic? | Wilfrid Hodges (School of Mathematical Sciences) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (21 Mar, 2012) titled "What would count as Ibn Sina (11th c. Persia) having first order logic?". Abstract: People debate whether first order logic was invented in 1879, or 1885, or 1928. I will push the boat out much further and discuss the case for around 1025. The question is methodological as much as historical. We have masses of evidence about what Ibn Sina did or didn't know in logic. But his notion of what logic does was so different from ours that there is no straightforward answer to the question 'Did he know first order logic?'. I will give the case for the answer Yes and the case for the answer No. | 1.5.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 8 | VideoSemantic Truth and the Correspondence Theory | Michael Glanzberg (Northwestern University) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Semantic Truth and the Correspondence Theory". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 9 | VideoLet Three Flowers Bloom | Toby Meadows (Arché Research Centre) gives a talk at the Axiomatic vs Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Let Three Flowers Bloom". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 10 | VideoDeflationism vs Representationalism | Jeffrey Ketland (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Deflationism vs Representationalism". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 11 | VideoStratified Truth? | Andrea Cantini (Florence) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Stratified Truth?". | 26.3.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 12 | VideoTruth, Syntax, Conservativity | Carlo Nicolai (Oxford) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Truth, Syntax, Conservativity". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 13 | VideoModelling the use of 'true' in natural Language | Theodora Achourioti (ILLC) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Modelling the use of 'true' in natural Language". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 14 | VideoTruth Without Detachment | Jc Beall (Connecticut, Otago) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Truth Without Detachment". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 15 | VideoA general approach to revenge paradoxes | Andrew Bacon (Oxford) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "A general approach to revenge paradoxes". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 16 | VideoA Conception of Set-Theoretical Truth | Luca Incurvati (Magdalene College Cambridge) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "A Conception of Set-Theoretical Truth". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 17 | VideoAxiomatic and Semantic Theories of Truth | Volker Halbach (Oxford) gives a talk at the Axiomatic versus Semantic Truth Conference (14-16 March, 2012) titled "Axiomatic and Semantic Theories of Truth". | 30.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 18 | VideoValidity without Reference | Christopher Gauker (Cincinnati) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 Feb, 2012) titled "Validity without Reference". Abstract: Two definitions of logical validity for a simple first-order language will be compared in order to decide which one provides a better model for the semantics for natural language. One of these is the standard model-theoretic definition. The other defines contexts as structures of linguistic objects and then defines validity as preservation of truth-in-a-context. The disadvantage of the model-theoretic definition is that it commits us to explicating the reference relation, which no one has ever been able to do. The context-logical definition avoids this commitment, although it takes on others. It particular, it commits to explaining what it takes for a given context to be the context that pertains to a conversation. As a three-valued theory, the context-logical definition generates a non-classical logic; this consequence will be defended. Inasmuch as it employs a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers, the context-logical definition faces a technical problem having to do with the omega rule. This will be addressed by arguing that even for purposes of defining logical validity, natural languages may be individuated in such a way as to contain no fixed number of singular terms. | 9.2.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 19 | VideoAdaptive Logics: Introduction, Applications, Computational Aspects and Recent Developments | Peter Verdée (Ghent) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (8 Feb, 2012) titled "Adaptive Logics: Introduction, Applications, Computational Aspects and Recent Developments". Abstract: Peter Verd ́ee (peter.verdee@ugent.be) Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science Ghent University, Belgium In this talk I give a thorough introduction to adaptive logics (cf. [1, 2, 3]). Adaptive logics are first devised by Diderik Batens and are now the main research area of the logicians in the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science in Ghent. First I explain the main purpose of adaptive logics: formalizing defea- sible reasoning in a unified way aiming at a normative account of fallible rationality. I give an informal characterization of what we mean by the notion ‘defeasible reasoning’ and explain why it is useful and interesting to formalize this type of reasoning by means of logics. Then I present the technical machinery of the so called standard format of adaptive logics. The standard format is a general way to define adaptive logics from three basic variables. Most existing adaptive logics can be defined within this format. It immediately provides the logics with a dynamic proof theory, a selection semantics and a number of important meta-theoretic properties. I proceed by giving some popular concrete examples of adaptive logics in standard form. I quickly introduce inconsistency adaptive logics, adap- tive logics for induction and adaptive logics for reasoning with plausible knowledge/beliefs. Next I present some computational results on adaptive logics. The adap- tive consequence relation are in general rather complex (I proved that there are recursive premise sets such that their adaptive consequence sets are Π1- complex – cf. [4]). However, I argue that this does not harm the naturalistic aims of adaptive logics, given a specific view on the relation between actual reasoning and adaptive logics. Finally, two interesting recent developments are presented: (1) Lexi- cographic adaptive logics. They fall outside of the scope of the standard format, but have similar properties and are able to handle prioritized infor- mation. (2) Adaptive set theories. Such theories start form the unrestricted comprehension axiom scheme but are strong enough to serve as a foundation for an interesting part of classical mathematics, by treating the paradoxes in a novel, defeasible way. | 9.2.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 20 | VideoMathematical cognition and mathematical structuralism | Valentin Sorin Costreie (Bucharest) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 Feb, 2012) titled "Mathematical cognition and mathematical structuralism". Abstract: Recent studies concerning mathematical cognition show that we may find mathematical cognitive capacities in young infants and monkeys. They show that we possess an innate intuition of small natural integers around the age of six month, and thus they are commonly interpreted in the sense of providing new grounds for a revival of Kantian intuitionism. Yet, if we speak of intuitions, they are intuitions of what? So, the target of my study will be to clarify the role played by intuitions in mathematical cognition, trying to better see the connection between mathematical cognition, intuitionism and structuralism. | 9.2.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 21 | VideoRound Table on Acceptance (Part 2) | Kevin Kelly (CMU Pittsburgh), Hanti Lin (CMU Pittsburgh), and Hannes Leitgeb (LMU/MCMP) discuss philosophical theories of acceptance, belief revision, and formal/conceptual common grounds in part 2 ("Truth Table") of the Round Table on Acceptance (3 Feb, 2012). Abstract: The Bayesianist concept of belief is described by a measure-theoretic and thus quantitative approach to probabilities as changeable degrees of belief, whereas classical epistemology views belief/acceptance as a qualitative notion. Questions arise from this contrast: How can the two concepts be related? Which bridge principles can be drawn on to accomplish this task? This public MCMP event is to bring the philosophical theories of Leitgeb and Kelly/Lin to one table. | 11.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 22 | VideoRound Table on Acceptance (Part 1) | Kevin Kelly (CMU Pittsburgh), Hanti Lin (CMU Pittsburgh), and Hannes Leitgeb (LMU/MCMP) present formal theories of acceptance and their application in part 1 ("Table of Contents") of the Round Table on Acceptance (3 Feb, 2012). Abstract: The Bayesianist concept of belief is described by a measure-theoretic and thus quantitative approach to probabilities as changeable degrees of belief, whereas classical epistemology views belief/acceptance as a qualitative notion. Questions arise from this contrast: How can the two concepts be related? Which bridge principles can be drawn on to accomplish this task? This public MCMP event is to bring the philosophical theories of Leitgeb and Kelly/Lin to one table. | 18.4.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 23 | VideoGeneral-Elimination Harmony | Stephen Read (St. Andrews) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (2 Feb, 2012) titled "General-Elimination Harmony". Abstract: Michael Dummett introduced the notion of harmony in response to Arthur Prior's tonkish attack on the idea of proof-theoretic justification of logical laws (or analytic validity). But Dummett vacillated between different conceptions of harmony, in an attempt to use the idea to underpin his anti-realism. Dag Prawitz had already articulated an idea of Gerhard Gentzen's into a procedure whereby elimination-rules are in some sense functions of the corresponding introduction-rules. The corresponding conception of general-elimination harmony ensures that the introduction-rules are transparent in the meaning they confer, in that the elimination-rules match the meaning the introduction-rules confer exactly. | 7.2.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 24 | VideoDoes Radical Uncertainty Require Regime Change? | Leonard A. Smith (LSE) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Does Radical Uncertainty Require Regime Change?". | 28.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 25 | VideoHow uncertain do we need to be? | Jon Williamson (Kent) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "How uncertain do we need to be?". | 28.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 26 | VideoLogics for 'Soft' Interactive Epistemology | Sonja Smets (ILLC Amsterdam) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Logics for 'Soft' Interactive Epistemology". | 27.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 27 | VideoDynamic Logic of Reasoning | Barteld Kooi (Groningen) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Dynamic Logic of Reasoning". | 27.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 28 | VideoSubjective probabilities need not be sharp | Jake Chandler (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Subjective probabilities need not be sharp". | 27.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 29 | VideoOrdering Risky Prospects - Prioritarianism: an Ecumenical Approach | Luc Bovens (LSE) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Ordering Risky Prospects - Prioritarianism: an Ecumenical Approach". | 27.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 30 | VideoThe Precautionary Principle Reconceptualized | Kai Spiekermann (LSE) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "The Precautionary Principle Reconceptualized". | 27.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 31 | VideoLogical abstractions and logical objects in Frege: a critical approach | Matthias Schirn (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (26 Jan, 2012) titled "Logical abstractions and logical objects in Frege: a critical approach". Abstract: In this talk, I shall critically discuss some key issues related to Frege’s notion of logical object, his paradigms of second-order abstraction principles (Hume’s Principle and Axiom V; see my handout), his logicism and, if time allows, the position which has come to be known as neo-logicism. Although the notion of logical object plays a key role in Frege’s foundational project, it has hardly been analyzed in depth so far. I shall begin by explaining the connection between logical abstraction and logical objects. A schema for a Fregean abstraction principle can be stated as follows: Q(a) = Q(b) « Req(a, b). Here “Q” is a singular term-forming operator,a and b are free variables of the appropriate type, ranging over the members of a given domain, and “Req” is the sign for an equivalence relation holding between the values of a and b. I call an abstraction principle logical if the equivalence relation, denoted on its right-hand side, can be defined in second-order or higher-order logic. I shall argue that Frege’s principal motive for introducing extensions of concepts into his logical theory is not to be able to make indirect statements about concepts, but rather to define all numbers as logical objects of a fundamental and an irreducible kind in order to ensure that we have the right cognitive access to them qua logical objects via Axiom V. Nonetheless, reducibility to extensions cannot be the ultimate criterion for Frege of what is to be regarded as a logical object. In the second part, I shall briefly examine Frege’s problem of ref erential indeterminacy of numerical singular terms in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) and of course-of-values terms in his opus magnum The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (vol. I, 1893/vol II, 1903). This problem arises from what is usually called “the Julius Caesar problem”. In The Foundations, Frege attempted to introduce cardinal numbers as logical objects by means of Hume’s Principle (after having explored an unsuccessful inductive definition). The attempt miscarried, because in its role as a contextual definition Hume’s Principle fails to fix uniquely the reference of the cardinality operator “the number which belongs to the concept j”: it does not place us in a position to decide whether, say, the number of planets is identical with Julius Caesar. I argue that the Caesar problem which is supposed to stem originally from Frege’s tentative inductive definition of the natural numbers in The Foundations, §55 is only spurious; that the genuine Caesar problem deriving from Hume’s Principle is a purely semantic one and that the prospects of removing it by explicitly dcfining cardinal numbers as extensions of concepts (as equivalence classes of equinumerosity) or otherwise are presumably poor. Moreover, I intend to show that in The Foundations Frege could hardly have construed Hume’s Principle as a primitive truth of logic and used it as an axiom governing the cardinality operator as a primitive sign. When Frege comes to introduce his prototype of a logical object, namely courses-of-values of first-level functions — which include extensions of first-level concepts and of first-level relations as special cases — via Axiom V in Frege 1893, he encounters a variant of his old indeterminacy problem from The Foundations, now clad in formal garb. I shall confine myself to making some critical comments on Frege’s attempt to overcome the referential indeterminacy of course-of-values terms. In the third and final part, I shall try to shed new light on several aspects of Frege’s logicist programme from the point of view of both his theory of the cardinals and his theory of the reals. One issue that I focus on is Frege’s original plan, only mentioned in Frege 1884 but never carried out by him, to intro | 26.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 32 | VideoCan free evidence be bad? | Seamus Bradley (LSE) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Can free evidence be bad?" (joint work with Katie Steele). | 26.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 33 | VideoUpdating on Conditionals | Soroush Rafiee Rad (Tilburg) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "Updating on Conditionals" (joint work with Stephan Hartmann). | 26.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 34 | VideoThe Bayesian Miracle | Kevin T. Kelly (CMU) gives a talk at the Rationality & Decision Meeting Munich (26-28 Jan, 2012) titled "The Bayesian Miracle". | 26.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 35 | VideoTruth Approximation by Basic and Refined Belief Base Revision | Theo A. F. Kuipers (Groningen) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (25 Jan, 2012) titled "Truth Approximation by Basic and Refined Belief Base Revision". Abstract: In a forthcoming paper, I have generalized the bridge, due to Cevolani, Crupi and Festa (2011), between the conjunctive approach of verisimilitude and AGM-Hansson belief base revision from finite propositional languages to the general case of approaching any divide of a (finite or infinite) universe, allowing all relevant interpretations. The present paper extends this general form of basic truth approximation by ‘basic’ belief base revision to refined (i.e. similarity based) truth approximation by a refined form of belief base revision, inspired by Grove’s spheres approach and Rabinowizc’s similarity foundation of it, which is similar to, but not equivalent to, so-called partial meet revision. The presentation is an improved and extended version of the paper presented at the 14th LMPS-congress (2011) in Nancy. In a previous attempt (Kuipers, 2011) to dovetail belief revision and truth approximation, restricted to the nomic interpretation and to maximal theories, I succeeded in overcoming the problem asking for refinement by taking refined forms of belief revision into account, notably partial meet revision, using already Adam Grove’s spheres approach (Grove, 1988) and Wlodek Rabinowizc’s similarity foundation of it (Rabinowicz, 1995). However, that dovetail attempt was unsatisfactory in having an ad hoc feature already in its basic form. | 25.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 36 | VideoWhy Metrical Properties are not Powers | Andreas Bartels (Bonn) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (19 Jan, 2012) titled "Why Metrical Properties are not Powers". Abstract: What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar 2003, Mumford 2004, Bird 2007) to offer to the scientific understanding of physical properties? – The paper provides an answer to this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not ‘powers’, i.e. they cannot be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws. | 19.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 37 | VideoFrege’s Philosophy of Geometry | Matthias Schirn (LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (18 Jan, 2012) titled "Frege’s Philosophy of Geometry". Abstract: My talk tonight is in five sections. I begin with introductory remarks. In the second section, I cast a glance at Frege’s early views on geometry and arithmetic, while in the third I comment on the relationship between Frege’s and Kant’s views of geometrical knowledge. In the fourth section, I examine, in a critical way, Frege’s remarks on space, spatial intuition, and geometrical axioms in a key passage of his book The Foundations of Arithmetic of 1884. I conclude with critical remarks on the topic “Frege and non-Euclidean geometry” and a succinct overall assessment of Frege’s philosophy of geometry. | 18.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 38 | VideoAn Empirically testable Theory of Causality | Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (12 Jan, 2012) titled "An Empirically testable Theory of Causality". Abstract: Is the concept of causality a cognitive illusion without empirical content (as Hume taught us), or does it have a cognitively and empirically valuable function? This is the central question of this talk. I argue that should be understood as a theoretical concept, in analogy with "force" in Newtonian physics. The difference is only that 'causality' does not beong to a particular scientific discipline, but to a transdisciplinary theory. Causal-effect relations explain and/or predict certain (in)stability properties of probabilistic dependencies, namely screening-off and linking-up. I develop a theory of causality, based on causal graph theory, and prove theorems that demonstrate that this theory has empirical content, i.e., excludes logically possible probability distributions. | 12.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 39 | VideoModeling AGM Belief Revision by Possible Worlds Semantics: The Case of Chellas-Segerberg Semantics | Matthias Unterhuber (Düsseldorf) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (12 Jan, 2012) titled "Modeling AGM Belief Revision by Possible Worlds Semantics: The Case of Chellas-Segerberg Semantics". Abstract: Both AGM belief revision and conditional logics use the Ramsey test to spell out how to evaluate (indicative) conditionals. In AGM belief revision the Ramsey test is specified on the basis of belief revision operations. In my talk I will take the reverse approach and explore in how far a conditional logic interpretation of possible worlds semantics with the Ramsey test can model belief revision. For that purpose I will use the Chellas-Segerberg semantics, which does not presuppose orderings of possible worlds, but allows - as I argue in my PhD thesis - for a plausible interpretation of conditionals in terms of a qualitative Ramsey test. My approach contrasts with possible worlds accounts of AGM belief revision in the literature, which either employ a Lewis' type sphere semantics (e.g., Grove, Segerberg) or else a temporal logic semantics (e.g., Bonanno). Matthias Unterhuber is a post-doctoral research fellow at the chair of theoretical philosophy (Gerhard Schurz) in Duesseldorf. He recently completed his PhD on possible worlds semantics for conditionals. His interests include conditional logic, modal logic, belief revision, Bayesianism, human reasoning, prototype theory and causality. | 12.1.12 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 40 | VideoConstants and Consequences | Denis Bonnay (Paris) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (8 Dec, 2011) titled "Constants and Consequences (joint work with D. Westerstahl)". Abstract: Given an interpreted language and a set of logical constants, Tarski's semantic definition of logical consequence yields a consequence relation. But given a consequence relation, is there a natural way to extract from it a set of logical constants? In this talk, we will compare two ways of doing so, one purely syntactical, which is based on the idea that an expression is logical if it is essential to the validity of at least one inference, and one semantical, which is based on the idea that an expression is logical if its interpretation is fully determined by the rules for its use. | 15.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 41 | VideoDevelopment of Counterfactual Reasoning & Emotions | Josef Perner (Salzburg) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (14 Dec, 2011) titled "Development of Counterfactual Reasoning & Emotions". Abstract: Controlling for suppositional reasoning when asked counterfactual questions children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning before 9 to 12 years. Without this control even 3 year olds can give correct answers. For instance when asked, “Suppose Carol takes her dirty shoes off before she walks across the floor, will the floor be dirty or clean?” one has no logically valid answer but one might find “clean” the more suitable option. And children tend to do so. Now when told: “Carol walked with her dirty shoes across the sparkling floor and made it all dirty,” the counterfactual question, “If Carol had taken her shoes off before walking across the floor, would the floor be dirty or clean?” can now be answered with some justification with “clean.” Children as young as 3 years do so (Harris et al 1986). However, from their responses we cannot tell whether they used counterfactual reasoning or simply applied suppositional reasoning, since both lead to the same answer. If we now change the story slightly: “Peter walked with his dirty shoes across the sparkling floor and then came Carol with her dirty shoes and walked across it. Now the floor is all dirty,” then the counterfactual question, “If Carol had taken off her shoes, …?” should be answered with “(still) dirty,” because the floor was already dirty before Carol walked across it. In contrast, suppositional reasoning would still lead to “clean,” and now only children between 9 and 12 years start giving the correct counterfactual answer. We have now established that this finding is robust for different ways of assessing counterfactual reasoning. Moreover, the onset of counterfactual emotions of regret and relief also follows the same developmental course. | 15.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 42 | VideoLogic or probability? An ERP study on defeasible reasoning | Michiel van Lambalgen (Amsterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (10 Nov, 2011) titled "Logic or probability? An ERP study on defeasible reasoning". Abstract: Currently there is a vociferous debate over the question, whether actual human non-monotonic reasoning is best captured by a non-monotonic logic, or by probability theory. We take as concrete example the 'suppression task' in which supplementary information may lead to the withdrawal of an earlier conclusion from a modus ponens argument. We present logical and probabilistic models of this phenomenon and discuss the impact of recent EEG data on the validity of these models. | 10.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 43 | VideoThe completeness of Kant's Table of Judgements and its consequences for philosophy of mathematics | Michiel van Lambalgen (Amsterdam) and Dora Achourioti (Amsterdam) give a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 Nov, 2011) titled "The completeness of Kant's Table of Judgements and its consequences for philosophy of mathematics". Abstract: It is a common belief among logicians that Kant's discussion of logic in his Critique of Pure Reason has little to offer to modern practitioners, since it appears to consist only of syllogistics plus some propositional inferences. Kant himself considered logic to be an integral part of the architecture of the Critique of Pure Reason, and in the Transcendental Deductions he attempted to show that the possible logical forms of judgements lead to the 12 Categories (e.g. causality) and the principles governing their use. However, if Kant's logic is indeed 'mathematically trivial and terrifyingly narrow-minded', as one commentator put it, then Kant's own view of his procedure is untenable. The groundwork for a revisionist view of Kant's logic has been laid by Béatrice Longuenesse's book 'Kant and the capacity to judge' (1998), which argues that Kant had indeed solid grounds for linking the Categories and logical forms of judgements. Re-reading Kant with Longuenesse's thesis in mind, one sees that Kant's logic is mathematically far from trivial. We sketch some theorems which together show that Kant's logic is 'geometric logic' (Vickers, Coquand, ...). Geometric logic is expressive enough to formalise Euclidean geometry. It's natural logic is intuitionistic, and we'll discuss the implications of this result for Kant's philosophy of mathematics. | 9.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 44 | VideoThe ghosts of departed quantities as the soul of computation | Sam Sanders (Belgium) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The ghosts of departed quantities as the soul of computation". Abstract: Using techniques from Nonstandard Analysis, we introduce omega-invariance: a new notion of computability based on infinitesimals. We show that omega-invariance can capture two central notions of computability, namely those provided by Recursion Theory and Constructive Analysis. We discuss the philosophical implications of these results. | 15.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 45 | VideoThe Power of the Hexagon | Jean-Yves Beziau (Rio de Janeiro) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (15 Dec, 2011) titled "The Power of the Hexagon". Abstract: In this lecture I will present and discuss the hexagon of opposition, an improvement of the square of opposition due to Robert Blanché. The hexagon of Blanché is made of a triangle of contrariety and a triangle of subcontrariety linked together by the relations of contradiction and subalternation. This hexagon includes the traditional square and can be extended to three dimensional objects giving a better understanding of modalities and negations. I will also show how this simple logical structure based on three oppositions can be applied to many different concepts ranging from logic to music, through metalogic, economy and semiotics. | 15.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 46 | VideoRetrocausality - What Would it Take? | Huw Price (Cambridge) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Retrocausality - What Would it Take?". Abstract: Some writers argue that retrocausality offers an attractive loophole in Bell's Theorem, allowing an explanation of EPR-Bell correlations without "spooky action-at-a-distance." This idea originated more than a decade before Bell's famous result, when de Broglie's student, Olivier Costa de Beauregard, first proposed that retrocausality plays a role in EPR contexts. The proposal is difficult to assess, because there has been little work on the general question of what a world with retrocausality would "look like" - what kinds of considerations, if any, would properly lead to the conclusion that we do live in such a world. In this talk I discuss these general issues, with the aim of bringing the more specific question as to whether quantum theory implies retrocausality into sharper focus than has hitherto been possible. | 15.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 47 | VideoAbstract Explanation and Difference-Making | Christopher Pincock (Missouri) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Abstract Explanation and Difference-Making". Abstract: Recent work on scientific explanation by Woodward and Strevens has emphasized the significance of causal explanation. Both philosophers allow for a kind of non-causal explanation, but have done little to clarify its importance for science or its relationship to causal explanation. In this paper I argue for a kind of non-causal explanation that I call abstract explanation. Abstract explanation is a kind of explanation that requires a generalization of the notion of difference-making that is central to both Woodward and Strevens. From this more general perspective, one can see how non-causal relationships can make a difference to a scientific phenomenon. This sort of connection is illustrated using two cases where a mathematical truth is crucial to a scientific explanation. I conclude that only a broad notion of explanation that encompasses both causal and non-causal explanation is feasible. | 8.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 48 | VideoCausal structural realism | Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Causal structural realism". Abstract: Der Vortrag entwickelt zwei Thesen: (1) Die fundamentalen physikalischen Eigenschaften sind in erster Linie Relationen statt intrinsischer Eigenschaften, so dass der fundamentale physikalische Bereich aus Strukturen statt einzelner Objekte mit einer intrinsischen Identität besteht. (2) Die physikalischen Strukturen sind kausal wirksam und unterscheiden sich dadurch von mathematischen Strukturen. Ich argumentiere für diese Thesen, indem ich ihre Konsequenzen sowohl für die Metaphysik von Objekten und Eigenschaften als auch für die Philosophie der Physik und die Naturphilosophie allgemein aufzeige. | 7.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 49 | VideoThe First-Order Logic of the Tractatus | Kai F. Wehmeier (Irvine) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The First-Order Logic of the Tractatus". Abstract: First-order logic with identity, while not isolated as a logical system in its own right until the end of the 1920s, is arguably a natural fragment of the logic envisaged by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We will discuss two distinctive features of the system sketched there, namely the abolition of the equality sign and the use of a (purportedly) single logical constant, the so-called N-operator. Building on early work by Hintikka, we identify three possible variable conventions that Wittgenstein might have used to eliminate the equality sign without loss of expressive power, and we adduce textual, historical and systematic evidence for one of these as the intended convention. With respect to the N-operator, we show that an effective notation for variable scope is implicit in the Tractatus when taken in its historical context, thus bolstering the case made by Geach against Fogelin's claim of expressive inadequacy. We close by showing how both conventions can be simultaneously implemented in perfectly workable tableau calculi. | 1.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 50 | VideoSystematicity: The Nature of Science | Paul Hoyningen-Huene (Hannover) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Systematicity: The Nature of Science". | 1.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 51 | VideoLogic in Games | Johan van Benthem gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Logic in Games". Abstract: We discuss logic *of* games as a foundation for rational interaction, suggesting a 'theory of play' extending standard game theory. We also discuss logic *as* games, the other direction of this contact. We conclude by looking at some natural entanglements between the two perspectives. | 1.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 52 | VideoLogical Dynamics of Intelligent Interaction | Johan van Benthem gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Logical Dynamics of Intelligent Interaction". Abstract: We morivate the logical dynamics of information-driven agency, and then discuss it from three perspectives: as a natural extension of the traditional scope of logic, as a foundation for the interdisciplinary study of agency, and as a source of new mathematical issues of pure interest. | 1.12.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 53 | VideoTruth and Context Change | Andreas Stokke (Oslo) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Truth and Context Change". Abstract:Traditional semantics rests on the notion that the meaning of a declarative sentence is given by its truth conditions. Beginning in the 1980's this paradigm was challenged by so-called dynamic semantics. According to these theories, the meaning of a sentence is a context change potential, a measure of how an utterance of the sentence in question affects the conversational context. The shift importantly involves the claim that truth-conditional meanings can be derived from context change potentials. I argue that a standard way this has been done has problematic consequences, and I discuss the status of the dynamic turn in light of these issues. | 17.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 54 | VideoApplications of multi-dimensional propositional logics | Ingolf Max (Leipzig) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Applications of multi-dimensional propositional logics". Abstract: Multi-dimensional propositional logics are formal systems which we get if we extend the language of classical propositional logic by ordered n-tuples of classical formulas and suitable operators having multi-dimensional expressions as their arguments. There are several kinds of motivation to deal with multi-dimensional logics in general and with multi-dimensional propositional logics in particular. One of them is connected with the program to reconstruct systems of non-classical logics within such a syntactically extended classical framework. Another kind of motivation is the possibility to show new basic aspects of formal systems which are of some important philosophical interest. Furthermore, it is possible to use the expressive power of such systems to translate expressions of natural languages (and, e.g., structured elements of music) into more complex formal ones. The familiar one-dimensional classical language plays then the role of a theoretical language. I will sketch the general form of multi-dimensional propositional systems with a fixed dimension n. It is possible to define several notions of validity (inconsistency) for ordered n-tuples of classical formulas using only the classical vocabulary. With respect to a more formal application of our logics it will be shown how finite many-valued logics can be equivalently reconstructed. But it is also interesting to see under which restrictions on our languages we get these formal results. With respect to a more philosophical application it will be demonstrated that the distinctions atomic–molecular, atomic–complex depend on the underlying logic, the choice of the logical complexity of basic expressions. With respect to empirical applications and leaving the strong analogy to finite many-valued logics we can include other well-defined parts of the whole language. | 16.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 55 | VideoHow can we find some reasoning that people do, for which a particular logic is the appropriate model? | Keith Stenning (Edinburgh) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "How can we find some reasoning that people do, for which a particular logic is the appropriate model?". Abstract:The psychology of deductive reasoning has extensively investigated tasks which it has supposed classical logic to be the appropriate standard of reasoning for, and the goal that subjects adopt in its laboratories. \cite{stvl08:book} presents evidence for a range of these tasks that a substantial proportion of subjects do not adopt this goal, and that defeasible logics (specifically Logic Programming) provide better models of their understanding of what they are supposed to do. Apart from issues about the `fit' of defeasible logics to the data of existing tasks, this argument points to the question whether untrained people do ever adopt classical logic as a model, and if so how to find tasks where this adoption is maximised and most clearly contrasted with other possible logical models. This talk will briefly outline the narrowness of the tasks that have been used, and propose a method of designing better. Results from a pilot experiment will illustrate some initial progress, and perhaps throw some light on general issues about how to match empirical evidence to logical model. | 11.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 56 | VideoModeling Semantic Competence: a Critical Review of Frege's Puzzle (as an argument against Millianism) | Rasmus K. Rendsvig (Roskilde) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Modeling Semantic Competence: a Critical Review of Frege's Puzzle (as an argument against Millianism)". Abstract: I will discuss Frege's Puzzle about Identity as an argument against a Millian theory of meaning for proper names. The key notion analyzed is semantic competence. Strict notions of semantic competence are extrapolated from a two-sorted first order epistemic logical modeling of a cognitive neuropsychological theory of the structure of lexical competence. The model allows for a rigorous analysis of Frege's argument. The theory and model of lexical semantic competence includes a multitude of types of competence, each yielding a different argument, far from all being as decisive against Millianism as has been the mainstream assumption in 20th century philosophy of language. | 3.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 57 | VideoEmpirical Research and The Philosophy of Mathematics | Markus Pantsar (Helsinki) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Empirical Research and The Philosophy of Mathematics". Abstract:In the philosophy of mathematics, one of the most fundamental questions concerns how mathematical methods help us get knowledge of the world. In this, mathematics with its apparent a priori character seems to be radically different from the empirical methods we otherwise rely on in science. This relation between the mathematical and the empirical has received extensive treatment from the likes of Quine, Putnam and Kitcher. In this talk, however, I want to focus on a different approach: what can we learn empirically about mathematical thinking and, in particular, what relevance does this have in philosophy? For this purpose, I will present some examples of results from psychology, animalstudies, sociology and the study of mathematical practice, and evaluate their philosophical importance. While such results are often inconclusive or irrelevant, I will contend that there are numerous studies concerning primitive mathematical thinking that we should take seriously in philosophy. In addition, I will formulate the outlines of an epistemological theory that can retain the special character of mathematical knowledge while not making it empirically unfeasible. | 3.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 58 | VideoTwo Varieties of Knowledge | Gerhard Ernst (Stuttgart) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Two Varieties of Knowledge". Abstract: The analysis of knowledge is, as it seems, a doomed project. Many definitions have been proposed – only to be refuted immediately. In this paper I argue that the reason for this predicament is that there are two slightly different varieties of knowledge which have to be analysed separately. So, the reason why no definition of knowledge is satisfactory is that there is no such defintion – but maybe there are two! | 2.11.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 59 | VideoNeglect of Independence and Uncertainty (or Randomness) in the Axioms of Probability | Patrick Suppes (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Neglect of Independence and Uncertainty (or Randomness) in the Axioms of Probability". | 28.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 60 | VideoOn a Proposed Extension of Infinitary Logic | Timothy Williamson (Oxford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "On a Proposed Extension of Infinitary Logic". Abstract: In discussing ‘translation’ schemes between possibilist discourse about merely possible objects and actualist discourse that abjures such objects, Kit Fine proposed interpreting quantifiers over pluralities or sets of possibilia using infinite sequences of modal operators and actualist quantifiers. After explaining the philosophical background, the talk will concern the more technical problem of interpreting such infinite sequences of operators. Various proposals will be assessed. The only ones that work depend on postulating possibilia in the meta-language. | 27.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 61 | VideoA Regret-Based Model for Wishful Thinkers | Simone Duca (RUB & HHU) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "A Regret-Based Model for Wishful Thinkers". Abstract: The study of decision making can be divided into three categories, according to how much information is available to the agent. We talk of decision making under risk, uncertainty and ignorance, whenever the agent is facing a decision under complete probabilistic knowledge, incomplete probabilistic knowledge and no probabilistic knowledge re- spectively. In my talk, I wish to focus on decision making under ig- norance and propose a decision model where the agent either has no prior probabilities at all or she deliberately ignores them when given. The model is an attempt to capture two facts: a) people are not very good at reasoning with probabilities and b) people tend to be unreal- istically optimistic when making a decision. In other words, in many situations, people are inveterate wishful thinkers. This can be repre- sented by applying a non-probabilistic rule which aims at minimising the worst-case scenario regret. I discuss some properties and applica- tions of the model and give evidence for the descriptive aptness of the model. | 27.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 62 | VideoLogics as Scientific Theories | Timothy Williamson (Oxford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Logics as Scientific Theories". Abstract: Logic has far more in common with other branches of science than is usually recognized. One major aim of science is to develop theories that are true, highly general, and maximally informative subject to those constraints. When the generality requirement is made precise in some natural ways, related to Tarski’s account of logical consequence, the resultant theories meet central requirements for logical systems. An appropriate methodology for choosing between different candidate theories has many similarities to the methodology for theory choice in other branches of science. This involves no reduction of logic to psychology, linguistics, or specifically natural science. The talk will be illustrated with examples from modal logic. | 26.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 63 | VideoA Generalised Sorites | Mark Colyvan (Sydney) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "A Generalised Sorites ". Abstract: I present a topological version of the sorites paradox that holds both practical and theoretical interest. On the theoretical side, the topological sorites reveals shortcomings of some of the standard philosophical treatments of the garden-variety sorites, it forces us to rethink our definition of 'vagueness', and it suggests that the liar and sorites paradoxes are much closer related than one might think. On the practical side, the topological sorites is found in various applied scientific contexts, giving rise to a particularly nasty kind of uncertainty; its interest is not merely philosophical. | 20.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 64 | VideoAre Theories of Reference Empirically Testable? | Daniel Cohnitz (Tartu) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Are Theories of Reference Empirically Testable?". | 20.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 65 | VideoThe Ins and Outs of Mathematical Explanation | Mark Colyvan (Sydney) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The Ins and Outs of Mathematical Explanation". Abstract: Proofs of mathematical theorems tell us that the theorem is true, but some proofs go further and tell us why the theorem is true. That is, some, but not all, proofs are explanatory. Call this intra-mathematical explanation. It has been argued that whenever there are physical applications of the theorems in question, we also have mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Call this extra-mathematical explanation. In this paper I will consider both intra- and extra-mathematical explanations and discuss why they are of philosophical interest. I will also make some speculative remarks about two promising accounts for a theory of mathematical explanation. | 19.10.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 66 | VideoSet-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability | Paul Harrenstein (TUM) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability". | 23.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 67 | VideoVariations of Avoiding the Arrow Impasse | Martin Rechenauer (LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Variations of Avoiding the Arrow Impasse". | 23.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 68 | VideoA Dictator Theorem on Belief Revision Derived from Arrow's Theorem | Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "A Dictator Theorem on Belief Revision Derived from Arrow's Theorem". | 23.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 69 | VideoIs theory choice using epistemic virtues possible? | Kit Patrick (Bristol) and Kate Hodesdon (Bristol) give a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Is theory choice using epistemic virtues possible?". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 70 | VideoModal Logic From a Categorical Point of View | Hans-Christoph Kotzsch (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Modal Logic From a Categorical Point of View". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 71 | VideoExplorations in Bayesian confirmation and models of information search | Vincenzo Crupi (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Explorations in Bayesian confirmation and models of information search". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 72 | VideoLogic as Modelling | Neil Coleman (Bristol) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Logic as Modelling". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 73 | VideoStructural Realism in Linguistics | Thomas Meier (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Structural Realism in Linguistics". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 74 | VideoMeaning and Interpretation in Birkhoff/Von Neumann quantum logic | Benjamin Eva (Bristol) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Meaning and Interpretation in Birkhoff/Von Neumann quantum logic". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 75 | VideoIs logical knowledge dispositional? | Florian Steinberger (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Is logical knowledge dispositional?". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 76 | VideoInexhaustibility and Reflection | Marianna Antonutti M. (Bristol) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Inexhaustibility and Reflection". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 77 | VideoValidity Curry | Julien Murzi (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "Validity Curry". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 78 | VideoAn Ontological Argument for the Existence of Numbers? | Johannes Korbmacher (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the Bristol-Munich Workshop titled "An Ontological Argument for the Existence of Numbers?". | 22.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 79 | VideoVoting, Deliberation and Truth | Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "Voting, Deliberation and Truth". Abstract: There are various ways to reach a group decision. One way is to simply vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses -- a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy (as everybody endorses the consensus), it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. What is more, a deliberation is easy to bias as those group members who make others change their mind may not necessarily be the best truth-trackers. But even if no such biases are present, the consensus may be far away from the truth. And so we ask: When is deliberation a better method to track the truth than simple majority voting? To address this question, we propose a Bayesian model of rational non-strategic deliberation and compare it to the straight forward voting procedure. The talk is based on joint work with Soroush Rafiee Rad. | 16.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 80 | VideoIPAD – Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy | Vincent Hendricks (Copenhagen/Columbia) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "IPAD – Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy". Abstract: Only one species have configured a democracy and decided to live according to deliberative democratic guidelines. The configuration and decision is particular to man. A deliberative democracy is characterized by both group deliberation, decision and action. Central to this epistemic composite is information as information processing is an essential fabric of rational deliberation, decision and action which in turn amount to the rational interaction among members of a group or a democracy. Thus, a robust deliberative democracy is the quintessential example of rational agent interaction. This intimate connection fuels a new research paradigm in interdisciplinary philosophy: IPAD -- Information Processing and the Analysis of Democracy. | 16.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 81 | VideoGroup Presentation, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU) | Members of the MCMP (Julien Murzi, Johannes Stern, Martin Fischer, Ole Hjortland, Marta Sznayder, Norbert Gratzl, Johannes Korbmacher) present their current research | 16.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 82 | VideoSelf-reference | Volker Halbach (Oxford) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "Self-reference". Abstract: What does it mean for a sentence to say about itself that it is P? Here P can stand for any unary sentential function such as 'is provable', 'is not provable', 'is true', or 'is a sentence'. I will study this question in a metamathematical setting. After reviewing some early attempts to tackle the question and their impact on problems in metamathematics such as Henkin's problem, I will put forward a new proposal and test its adequacy with some examples. | 13.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 83 | VideoAn "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism. | Branden Fitelson (Rutgers) gives a talk at the Workshop on Mathematical Philosophy titled "An "Evidentialist" Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.". Abstract: In this talk, I will raise a potential problem for Joyce's argument for probabilism (and sufficiently similar "accuracy-dominance"-based arguments for probabilism). The problem involves a potential conflict between "accuracy-dominance" (coherence) norms and certain "evidential" norms for credences. An interesting analogy with the case of full belief is also drawn (which connects up with a larger project on the relationship between accuracy, coherence, and evidential norms for various sorts of judgments). This is joint work with Kenny Easwaran. | 13.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 84 | VideoGroup Presentation, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU) | Members of the MCMP (Roland Poellinger, Florian Steinberger, Thomas Meier, Vincenzo Crupi and Olivier Roy) present their current research. | 13.9.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 85 | VideoTonk, Nontransitivity, and Tolerance | David Ripley (University of Melbourne) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Tonk, Nontransitivity, and Tolerance". | 13.8.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 86 | VideoThree contrasts between two senses of coherence | Teddy Seidenfeld (CMU) gives a talk in the talk series "MCMP & Statistics Department" titled "Three contrasts between two senses of coherence" (Joint work with M. J. Schervish and J. B. Kadane – Statistics, CMU). Abstract: B. de Finetti defended two senses of coherence in providing foundations for his theory of subjective probabilities. Coherence 1 requires that when a decision maker announces fair prices for random variables these are immune to a uniform sure-loss - no Book is possible using finitely many fair contracts! Coherence 2 requires that when a decision maker's forecasts for a finite set of random variables are evaluated by Brier Score - squared error loss - there is no rival set of forecasts that dominate with a uniformly better score for sure. De Finetti established these two concepts are equivalent: fair prices are coherent 1 if and only if they constitute a coherent 2 set of forecasts if and only if they are the expected values for the variables under some common (finitely additive) personal probability. I report three additional contrasts between these two senses of coherence. One contrast (relating to finitely additive probabilities) favors coherence 2. One contrast (relating to decisions with moral hazard) favors coherence 1. The third contrast relates to the challenge of state-dependent utilities. | 31.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 87 | VideoTolerance & Voluntarism | Paul Dicken (Cambridge) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Tolerance & Voluntarism". Abstract: Carnap's dissolution of the scientific realism debate rests upon two central claims:the first regarding the appropriate logical reconstruction of a scientific theory;the second, a background conception of the nature of ontological dispute. Recentwork has focused on the first of these claims; in this talk I discuss the second,and relate it to similar moves made by van Fraassen in his own articulation of empiricism. | 3.8.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 88 | VideoCarnap's Logico-Mathematical Neutrality between Realism and Instrumentalism | Michael Friedman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Carnap's Logico-Mathematical Neutrality between Realism and Instrumentalism". Abstract: I discuss the evolution of Carnap’s treatment of theoretical terms from the late1930s to his mature work on the Ramsey sentence formulation of scientific theoriesin the late 1950s and 1960s.I concentrate on Carnap’s use of this device toremain completely neutral between realism and instrumentalism.A central point ofdiscussion is his commitment to a purely logico-mathematical interpretation of thequantified existential variables in the Ramsey sentence.Far from being adesperate or ad hoc maneuver, I argue that this is essential to Carnap’s point ofview and, in particular, to the way in which he understands the characteristicallyabstract representations of modern mathematical physics throughout his intellectualcareer.In the end, Carnap recommends nothing more nor less than that we eschewfruitless “ontological” disputes in favor of cooperating with contemporarymathematical physicists in attempting (axiomatically) to clarify the mathematicaland conceptual foundations of their discipline.) | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 89 | VideoFrom Analysis to Explication | André Carus (Chicago/Cambridge) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "From Analysis to Explication". Abstract: Analytic philosophy was named for the "analysis" of propositions begun by Russelland Moore in the first years of the twentieth century, epitomized by the theory ofdescriptions.This style of analysis has been joined by many others since then. But they all share certain common defects, which are overcome by "explication," areplacement for all forms of analysis developed by Carnap in his later years.However, it was suggested by Quine, Dreben, and their students that Carnap's form ofexplication depends on metaphysical assumptions Quine dispensed with.It is arguedin this paper that this suggestion is based on misunderstandings, and thatexplication is preferable to analysis, especially since it offers a more plausible picture of philosophy. | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 90 | VideoCarnap on extremal axioms and categoricity | Georg Schiemer (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "Carnap on extremal axioms and categoricity". Abstract: The talk will investigate Carnap's early contributions to formal semantics in his work on general axiomatics between 1928 and 1936. Inparticular, we give a historically sensitive discussion of Carnap's theoryof extremal axioms from the late 1920s onwards. The main focus is seton the unpublished documents of the projected second part of UntersuchungenzurallgemeinenAxiomatik (RC 081-01-01 to 081-01-33).We present a formal reconstruction of the semantic notions 'formalmodel', 'model structure', und 'submodel' first formulated there. Themain interprctive issue addressed in the talk concerns Carnap's understandingof the relationship between the "completenessof the models"of an axiomatic theory and other metatheoretic notions investigatedby him at the time, most notably that of semantic completeness andcategoricity. | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 91 | VideoOn an occasionally heard objection to Carnap's conception of logical truth | Steve Awodey (CMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Carnap titled "On an occasionally heard objection to Carnap's conception of logical truth". | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 92 | VideoMathematical Science, Naturalism, and Normativity | Michael Friedman (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Mathematical Science, Naturalism, and Normativity". Abstract: I address concerns in contemporary philosophy about the place of mathematics andmoral (and other) norms in a naturalistic world picture. I think that these worriesare largely misplaced, and I address them with an historical narrative from Platoto Kant, beginning from the fact that Plato's original "platonism" (in the theoryof forms) tried to give a kind of unified account of both mathematics and moralnorms. I contend that this was not mysterious or "spooky" but a perfectlyreasonable and intelligible response to the state of mathematical science of thetime—especially concerned with the relationship between ideal mathematicalstructures and the physical world. I then explore how this last relationship wasfundamentally transformed in the early modern period, beginning with Galileo, andcontinuing from Descartes, through Leibniz and Newton, and finally to Kant—where aradically new kind of relationship between mathematics (especially appliedmathematics) and moral normativity (still in the spirit of Plato) then emerged. | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 93 | VideoHume on Space and Geometry | Graciela di Pierris (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Hume on Space and Geometry". Abstract: Hume’s discussion of space, time, and mathematics in Part II of Book I of theTreatise has appeared to many commentators as one of the weakest parts of his work.I argue, on the contrary, that Hume’s views on space and geometry are deeplyconnected with his radically empiricist reliance on phenomenologically given sensoryimages. He insightfully shows that, working within this epistemological model, wecannot attain complete certainty about the continuum but only at most about discretequantity. Therefore, geometry, in contrast to arithmetic, cannot be a fully exactscience. Nevertheless, Hume does have an illuminating account of Euclid’s geometryas an axiomatic demonstrative science, ultimately based on the phenomenologicalapprehension of the “easiest and least deceitful” sensory images of geometricalfigures. Hume’s discussion, in my view, demonstrates the severe limitations of apurely empiricist interpretation of the role of such figures (diagrams) in geometry. | 28.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 94 | VideoFrequencies, Chances and Undefinable Sets | Jan-Willem Romeijn (University of Groningen) gives a talk in the talk series "MCMP & Statistics Department" titled "Frequencies, Chances and Undefinable Sets". Abstract: In this talk I aim to clarify the concept of chance. The talk consists of two parts, concerning the epistemology and metaphysics of chance respectively. In the first part I consider statistical hypothese and their role in inference. I maintain that statistical hypotheses are best explicated along frequentist lines, following the theory of von Mises. I will argue that the well-known problems for frequentism do not apply in the inferential context. In the second part of the talk I ask what relation obtains between these frequentist hypotheses an the world. I will show that we can avoid the problem of the reference class, as well as the closely related conflict between determinism and chance, by means of a formal antireductionist argument: events can be assigned meaningful and nontrivial chances if they correspond to undefinable sets of events in the reducing theory. | 22.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 95 | VideoCore Logic | Neil Tennant (Ohio State University) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Core Logic". | 8.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 96 | VideoThe Contradiction in Will Test: A Reconstruction | Matthew Braham (University of Bayreuth) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The Contradiction in Will Test: A Reconstruction". | 8.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 97 | VideoLogic and the Brain | Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP/LMU) gives a lecture at the Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens-Stiftung titled "Logic and the Brain". Introductory words by Enno Aufderheide (secretary gemeral, Humboldt Foundation). | 8.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 98 | VideoPossibilities without possible worlds/histories | Tomasz Placek (Jagiellonian University, Kraków) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Possibilities without possible worlds/histories". Abstract: Possible worlds have turned out to be a particularly useful tool of modal metaphysics, although their globality makes them philosophically suspect. Hence, it would be desirable to arrive at some local modal notions that could be used instead of possible worlds. In this talk I will focus on what is known as historical (or real) modalities, an example of which is tomorrow's sea-battle. The modalities involved in this example are local since they refer to relatively small chunks of our world: a gathering of inimical fleets on a bay near-by has two alternative possible future continuations: one with a sea-battle and the other with no-sea battle. The objective of this talk is to sketch a theory of such modalities that is framed in terms of possible continuations rather than possible worlds or possible histories. The proposal will be tested as a semantic theory for a language with historical modalities, tenses, and indexicals. | 30.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 99 | VideoDiachronic Dutch Book Arguments for Forgetful Agents | Alistair M. C. Isaac (University of Michigan) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments for Forgetful Agents". Abstract: I present a general strategy for applying diachronic Dutch book arguments to bounded agents, with particular focus on forgetful agents. Dutch book arguments were introduced by subjectivists about probability to test the consistency of synchronic epistemic norms. Diachronic Dutch book arguments (DDBs) apply this technique to test the consistency of diachronic epistemic norms, norms about how beliefs change in time. Examples like forgetfulness have led some to doubt the relevance of DDBs for evaluating diachronic norms. I argue that there is no problem in applying DDBs to formally specified decision problems involving forgetfulness. The real worry here is whether these formal problems capture the relevant details of real world decision-making situations. I suggest some general criteria for making this assessment and defend the formalization of decision problems involving bounded agents, and their investigation via DDBs, as essential tools for evaluating epistemic norms. | 30.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 100 | VideoConditionals and Suppositions | Richard Bradley (LSE) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Conditionals and Suppositions". Abstract: Adams' Thesis - the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents - has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible worlds semantics. This paper considers the approaches to the problem taken by Jeffrey and Stalnaker (1994) and by McGee (1989), but rejects them on the grounds that they imply a false principle, namely that probability of a conditional is independent of any proposition inconsistent with its antecedent. Instead it is proposed that the semantic contents of conditionals be treated as sets of vectors of worlds, not worlds, where each co-ordinate of a vector specifies the world that is or would be true under some supposition. It is shown that this treatment implies the truth of Adams' Thesis whenever the mode of supposition is evidential. | 30.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 101 | VideoProof-theoretic semantics and the format of deductive reasoning & Prawitz's completeness conjecture (A sketch of some ideas) | Peter Schroeder-Heister (Tübingen) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium Mathematical Philosophy - first part: "Proof-theoretic semantics and the format of deductive reasoning", second part: "Prawitz's completeness conjecture (A sketch of some ideas)". | 17.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 102 | VideoKnowledge about Probability in the Monty Hall Problem | Charles B. Cross (University of Georgia) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "Knowledge about Probability in the Monty Hall Problem". | 15.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 103 | VideoThe Lockean Thesis Revisited | Hannes Leitgeb (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "The Lockean Thesis Revisited". | 15.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 104 | VideoApplying coherence based probability logic to philosophical problems | Niki Pfeifer (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "Applying coherence based probability logic to philosophical problems". | 15.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 105 | VideoFormal epistemological explication (news for the Bayesian agenda) | Vincenzo Crupi (MCMP/LMU) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "Formal epistemological explication (news for the Bayesian agenda)". | 15.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 106 | VideoAccuracy & Coherence | Branden Fitelson (Rutgers University) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Bayesian Methods in Philosophy titled "Accuracy & Coherence". Abstract: In this talk, I will explore a new way of thinking about the relationship between accuracy norms and coherence norms in epistemology (generally). In the first part of the talk, I will apply the basic ideas to qualitative judgments (belief and disbelief). This will lead to an interesting coherence norm for qualitative judgments (but one which is weaker than classical deductive consistency). In the second part of the talk, I will explain how the approach can be applied to comparative confidence judgments. Again, this will lead to coherence norms that are weaker than classical (comparative probabilistic) coherence norms. Along the way, I will explain how evidential norms can come into conflict with even the weaker coherence norms suggested by our approach. | 15.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 107 | VideoRussellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives (Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning) | Branden Fitelson (Rutgers University) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "Russellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives (Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning)". Abstract: The first part of this talk (which is joint work with Paul Oppenheimer) will be about the perils of representing claims involving Russellian definite descriptions in an "automated reasoning friendly" way. I will explain how to eliminate Russellian descriptions, so as to yield logically equivalent (and automated reasoning friendly) statements. This is a special case of a more general problem -- which is representing philosophical theories/explications in a way that automated reasoning tools can understand. The second part of the talk shows how automated reasoning tools can be useful in clarifying the structure (and requisite presuppositions) of well-known philosophical "theorems". Here, the example comes from the philosophy of language, and it involves a certain "triviality result" or "collapse theorem" for the indicative conditional that was first discussed by Gibbard. I show how one can use automated reasoning tools to provide a precise, formal rendition of Gibbard's "theorem". This turns out to be rather revealing about what is (and is not) essential to Gibbard's argument. | 11.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 108 | VideoToward Leibniz's Goal of a Computational Metaphysics | Ed Zalta (CSLI Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "Toward Leibniz's Goal of a Computational Metaphysics". | 11.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 109 | VideoComputing Non-Causal Knowledge for Causal Reasoning | Roland Poellinger (MCMP/LMU Munich) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "Computing Non-Causal Knowledge for Causal Reasoning". | 11.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 110 | VideoOn the Emergence of Descriptive Norms | Stephan Hartmann (Tilburg) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Computational Metaphysics titled "On the Emergence of Descriptive Norms". | 17.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 111 | VideoCognitive motivations for treating formalisms as calculi | Catarina Duthil-Novaes (ILLC/Amsterdam) gives at talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Cognitive motivations for treating formalisms as calculi". Abstract: In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap famously recommended that logical languages be treated as mere calculi, and that their symbols be viewed as meaningless; reasoning with the system is to be guided solely on the basis of its rules of transformation. Carnap˙s main motivation for this recommendation seems to be related to a concern with precision and exactness. In my talk, I argue that Carnap was right in insisting on the benefits of treating logical formalisms as calculi, but he was wrong in thinking that enhanced precision is the main advantage of this approach. Instead, I argue that a deeper impact of treating formalisms as calculi is of a cognitive nature: by adopting this stance, the reasoner is able to counter some of her „default“ reasoning tendencies, which (although advantageous in most practical situations) may hinder the discovery of novel facts in scientific contexts. One of these cognitive tendencies is the constant search for confirmation for the beliefs one already holds, as extensively documented and studied in the psychology of reasoning literature, and often referred to as confirmation bias/belief bias. Treating formalisms as meaningless and relying on their well-defined rules of formation and transformation allows the reasoner to counter her own belief bias for two main reasons: it 'switches off' semantic activation, which is thought to be a largely automatic cognitive process, and it externalizes reasoning processes; they now take place largely through the manipulation of the notation. I argue moreover that the manipulation of the notation engages predominantly sensorimotor processes rather than being carried out internally: the agent is literally 'thinking on the paper'. The analysis relies heavily on empirical data from psychology and cognitive sciences, and is largely inspired by recent literature on extended cognition (in particular Clark, Menary and Sutton). If I am right, formal languages treated as calculi and viewed as external cognitive artifacts offer a crucial cognitive boost to human agents, in particular in that they seem to produce a beneficial de-biasing effect. | 11.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 112 | VideoConclusive Reasons, Transmission, and Epistemic Closure | Charles B. Cross (University of Georgia) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Conclusive Reasons, Transmission, and Epistemic Closure". | 11.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 113 | VideoThe 'fitting problem' for logical semantic systems | Catarina Duthil-Novaes (ILLC/Amsterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The 'fitting problem' for logical semantic systems". Abstract: When applying logical tools to study a given extra-theoretical, informal phenomenon, it is now customary to design a deductive system, and a semantic system based on a class of mathematical structures. The assumption seems to be that they would each capture specific aspects of the target phenomenon. Kreisel has famously offered an argument on how, if there is a proof of completeness for the deductive system with respect to the semantic system, the target phenomenon becomes „squeezed“ between the extension of the two, thus ensuring the extensional adequacy of the technical apparatuses with respect to the target phenomenon: the so-called squeezing argument. However, besides a proof of completeness, for the squeezing argument to go through, two premises must obtain (for a fact e occurring within the range of the target phenomenon): (1) If e is the case according to the deductive system, then e is the case according to the target phenomenon. (2) If e is the case according to the target phenomenon, then e is the case according to the semantic system. In other words, the semantic system would provide the necessary conditions for e to be the case according to the target phenomenon, while the deductive system would provide the relevant sufficient conditions. But clearly, both (1) and (2) rely crucially on the intuitive adequacy of the deductive and the semantic systems for the target phenomenon. In my talk, I focus on the (in)plausibility of instances of (2), and argue That the adequacy of a semantic system for a given target phenomenon must not be taken for granted. In particular, I discuss the results presented in (Andrade-Lotero & Dutilh Novaes forthcoming) on multiple semantic systems for Aristotelian syllogistic, which are all sound and complete with respect to a reasonable deductive system for syllogistic (Corcoran˙s system D), but which are not extensionally equivalent; indeed, as soon as the language is enriched, they start disagreeing with each other as to which syllogistic arguments (in the enriched language) are valid. A plurality of apparently adequate semantic systems for a given target phenomenon brings to the fore what I describe as the „fitting problem“ for logical semantic systems: what is to guarantee that these technical apparatuses adequately capture significant aspects of the target phenomenon? If the different candidates have strikingly different properties (as is the case here), then they cannot all be adequate semantic systems for the target phenomenon. More generally, the analysis illustrates the need for criteria of adequacy for semantic systems based on mathematical structures. Moreover, taking Aristotelian syllogistic as a case study illustrates the fruitfulness but also the complexity of employing logical tools in historical analyses. | 8.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 114 | VideoModality and Categories | Steve Awodey (CMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Modality titled "Modality and Categories". | 6.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 115 | VideoInteracting Modal Predicates | Martin Fischer (MCMP/LMU Munich) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Modality titled "Interacting Modal Predicates". | 22.8.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 116 | VideoEvery Proposition is a Counterfactual (the Robustly Contingent Ones Nontrivially So) | Charles B. Cross (University of Georgia) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Modality titled "Every Proposition is a Counterfactual (the Robustly Contingent Ones Nontrivially So)". | 1.7.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 117 | VideoPossible Worlds, The Lewis Principle, and the Myth of a Large Ontology | Ed Zalta (Stanford) gives a talk at the MCMP Workshop on Modality titled "Possible Worlds, The Lewis Principle, and the Myth of a Large Ontology". | 6.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 118 | VideoAccuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle | Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle" | 1.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 119 | VideoTracking the Truth Requires a Non-wellfounded Prior! | Alexandru Baltag (ILLC Amsterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Tracking the Truth Requires a Non-wellfounded Prior! A Study in the Learning Power (and Limits) of Bayesian (and Qualitative) Update". Abstract: The talk is about tracking "full truth" in the limit by iterated belief updates. Unlike Sonja's talk (which focused on finite models), we now allow the initial model (and thus the initial set of epistemic possibilities) to be infinite. We compare the truth-tracking power of various belief-revision methods, including probabilistic conditioning (also known as Bayesian update) and some of its qualitative, "plausibilistic" analogues (conditioning, lexicographic revision, minimal revision). We focus in particular on the question on whether any of these methods is "universal" (i.e. as good at tracking the truth as any other learning method). We show that this is not the case, as long as we keep the standard probabilistic (or belief-revision) setting. On the positive side, we show that if we consider appropriate generalizations of conditioning in a non-standard, non-wellfounded setting, then universality is achieved for some (though not all) of these learning methods. In the qualitative case, this means that we need to allow the prior plausibility relation to be a non-wellfounded (though total) preorder. In the probabilistic case, this means moving to a generalized conditional probability setting, in which the family of "cores" (or "strong beliefs") may be non-wellfounded (when ordered by inclusion or logical entailament). As a consequence, neither the family of classical probability spaces, nor lexicographic probability spaces, and not even the family of all countably additive (conditional) probability spaces, are rich enough to make Bayesian conditioning "universal", from a Learning Theoretic point of view! This talk is based on joint work with Nina Gierasimczuk and Sonja Smets. | 26.5.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 120 | VideoDo 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception? | Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri, St. Louis) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?" | 23.5.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 121 | VideoThe conservativity of truth and the disentanglement of syntax and semantics | Volker Halbach (Oxford) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "The conservativity of truth and the disentanglement of syntax and semantics" | 23.5.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 122 | VideoTheory and Concept in Tarski's Philosophy of Language | Douglas Patterson (Universität Leipzig) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Theory and Concept in Tarski's Philosophy of Language". Abstract: In this talk I will set out some of the background of Tarski's famous work on truth and semantics by looking at important views of his teachers Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Stanislaw Lesniewski in the philosophy of langauge and the "methodology of deductive sciences". With the understanding of the assumed philosophy of language and logic of the important articles set out in this manner, I will look at a number of issues familiar from the literature. I will sort out Tarski's conception of "material adequacy", discuss the relationship between a Tarskian definition of truth and a conceptual analysis of a more familiar sort, and consider the consequences of the views presented for the question of whether Tarski was a deflationist or a correspondence theorist. | 25.5.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 123 | VideoBelief Dynamics under Iterated Revision: Cycles, Fixed Points and Truth-tracking | Sonja Smets (University of Groningen) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium titled "Belief Dynamics under Iterated Revision: Cycles, Fixed Points and Truth-tracking". Abstract: We investigate the long-term behavior of processes of learning by iterated belief-revision with new truthful information. In the case of higher-order doxastic sentences, the iterated revision can even be induced by repeated learning of the same sentence (which conveys new truths at each stage by referring to the agent's own current beliefs at that stage). For a number of belief-revision methods (conditioning, lexicographic revision and minimal revision), we investigate the conditions in which iterated belief revision with truthful information stabilizes: while the process of model-changing by iterated conditioning always leads eventually to a fixed point (and hence all doxastic attitudes, including conditional beliefs, strong beliefs, and any form of "knowledge", eventually stabilize), this is not the case for other belief-revision methods. We show that infinite revision cycles exist (even when the initial model is finite and even when in the case of repeated revision with one single true sentence), but we also give syntactic and semantic conditions ensuring that beliefs stabilize in the limit. Finally, we look at the issue of convergence to truth, giving both sufficient conditions ensuring that revision stabilizes on true beliefs, and (stronger) conditions ensuring that the process stabilizes on "full truth" (i.e. beliefs that are both true and complete). This talk is based on joint work with A. Baltag. | 26.5.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| 124 | VideoAlexander von Humboldt Professor Hannes Leitgeb | Once again, a candidate nominated by Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU) München has been awarded one of the coveted Alexander von Humboldt Professorships. The philosopher and mathematician Hannes Leitgeb, Professor of Mathematical Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics at the University of Bristol (UK), was selected to receive the accolade by an expert committee set up by the Humboldt Foundation. The prize, which is worth 5 million Euros, is financed by the Federal Ministry for Education and Research, and is the most richly endowed award of its kind in Germany. Leitgeb is one of the leading proponents of an approach to problems in logic, philosophy and the foundations of the scientific method that exploits insights from both philosophical analyses and mathematical theories of provability. In effect, he formulates philosophical questions as precisely posed mathematical propositions, allowing him not only to come up with solutions, but also to explain them with the utmost clarity. Hannes Leitgeb becomes the LMU’s third Humboldt Professor, joining Ulrike Gaul (Systems Biology) and Georgi Dvali (Astrophysics). Leitgeb is one of the most prominent scholars worldwide who tackle analytical philosophy and cognitive sciences with the help of mathematical logic. This multi-pronged approach is motivated by the conviction that philosophical investigations can best be advanced if their fundamental assumptions can be recast as mathematical models that make them more transparent and simpler to describe. As a Humboldt Professor at LMU, Leitgeb will provide the basis for the planned Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Language and Cognition, in which postgraduate and postdoctoral students in the fields of Philosophy, Logic and Mathematics will work together on common problems. The new Center will also collaborate with the Munich Center for Neuroscience, Brain and Mind (MCN). This institution was established in 2007, as the result of an internal competition (LMUinnovativ) to identify innovative ways of tackling questions related to the mind-brain problem. Its members utilize the whole spectrum of disciplines relevant to the neurosciences, from molecular biology, through systemic neurobiology, psychology and neurology, to philosophy. By fostering cooperation between widely diverse areas of study, the two Centers hope to make internationally significant contributions to theoretical and empirical brain sciences. Hannes Leitgeb's interdisciplinary orientation will help further sharpen the profile of the LMU’s Faculty of Philosophy by renewing its long-standing focus on the intersection between philososphy, logic and foundations of science, which is closely associated with the work of Wolfgang Stegmuller. This focus will also be given a future-oriented and internationally apparent impetus. Leitgeb first forged a firm link between philosophical logic and the cognitive sciences in his book “Inference on the Low Level. An Investigation into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition”. Here he showed that, under certain circumstances, state transitions in neural networks can be understood as simple ‘if ... then’ inferences. These in turn are known to follow laws governing the behaviour of logical systems that have emerged from studies in the philosophy of language and in theoretical computer science. Leitgeb is currently working on a monograph devoted to Rudolf Carnap’s “The Logical Structure of the World”. He hopes to give this classic text a new lease of life by highlighting the relevance of Carnap’s insights for modern scientific research. One of the aims of this latest endeavour is to discover how to transform theoretical scientific models into propositions framed in terms of our immediate sensory perceptions. To this end, Leitgeb is developing a theory of probability that permits valid inferences about systems which are themselves capable of generating statements about their own probability. | 8.6.11 | Kostenlos | In iTunes ansehen |
| Insgesamt: 124 Folgen |
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