Hearts and Minds

In 1954, the Geneva Agreement divided Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel. For the next decade, the United States undertook policies intended to guarantee the survival of the non-communist government in South Vietnam. This was a critical endeavor, as the failure of nation-building programs caused the United States to shift to a military strategy in Vietnam. Existing studies of U.S.-South Vietnamese relations in the 1950s and early 1960s have not adequately explored the role of the Ngô Đình Diệm government in the nation-building effort. Most historians have been content to focus on American policy, largely ignoring South Vietnamese programs. Through extensive use of Vietnamese and American sources, this dissertation provides a more complete account of nation-building in South Vietnam. This dissertation examines American and South Vietnamese attempts to use culture to create a viable nation in South Vietnam from 1954 to 1963. During this period, the American and South Vietnamese governments initiated programs to foster a sense of nationhood in South Vietnam. In the first years after the Geneva Agreement, these programs were meant to encourage support for Ngô Đình Diệm as a strong and able leader of South Vietnam. As Diệm’s regime took hold, the United States and South Vietnam changed their strategies. In the late 1950s, Diệm used public representations of Vietnamese history and culture to create a sense of Vietnamese nationalism in South Vietnam. At the same time, the United States initiated programs to introduce the people of South Vietnam to the dominant features of American culture, namely capitalism and democracy. American and South Vietnamese cultural strategies failed to win strong support for Diệm’s government. In the late 1950s, cultural nation-building programs were inconsistent and, at times, contradictory. American messages emphasizing the high standard of living enjoyed under capitalism, for example, contradicted Diệm’s calls for personal sacrifice for the nation. Furthermore, American and South Vietnam messages inadvertently brought attention to the economic and political shortcomings of the Diệm regime. As opposition to Diệm’s government grew, he used anti-democratic policies against his opponents, thus engendering further discontent in South Vietnam.